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We present and demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an
implementation with weak coherent pulses to obtain a high key generation rate. The key is obtained
by a simple time-of-arrival measurement on the data line; the presence of an eavesdropper is checked
by an interferometer on an additionalmonitoring line. The setup is experimentally simple; moreover,
it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus featuring
a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bit per qubit.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the only method
to distribute a secret key between two distant authorized
partners, Alice and Bob, whose security is based on the
laws of physics [1]. QKD is the most mature field in
quantum information; nevertheless, there is still some
work ahead in order to build a practical system which
is reliable and at a same time fast and provably secure.
This paper presents an important improvement in this
direction. The quest for rapidity is the inspiring motiva-
tion of this system: the idea is to obtain the secret bits
from the simplest possible measurement (here, the time
of arrival of a pulse) without introducing lossy optical
elements at Bob’s. Security is obtained by occasionally
checking quantum coherence: in QKD, a decrease of co-
herence is attributed to the presence of the eavesdropper
Eve, who has attacked the line and obtained some in-
formation on the bit values, at the price of introducing
errors. Reliability is achieved by using standard telecom
components; in particular, the source is an attenuated
laser, and bits are encoded in time-bins, robust against
polarization effects in fibers. In this paper, we first define
the protocol and demonstrate its advantages: simplicity,
and robustness against both reduced interference visibil-
ity and photon number splitting (PNS) attacks [2]. Then,
we present a first proof-of-principle experiment.
The protocol. To date, the most developed setups
for practical QKD implement the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [3] using phase encoding between two
time-bins, as sketched in Fig. 1 Top (see [1] for a detailed
description). The four states belonging to two mutually
orthogonal bases are the |1〉|0〉+ eiα|0〉|1〉 where α = 0, pi
(bits 0 and 1 in the X basis) or α = pi
2
, 3pi
2
(bits 0 and
1 in the Y basis). Bob detects in the X (Y) basis by
setting β = 0 (β = pi
2
). Both bases correspond thus to
an interferometric measurement. As a first step towards
simplicity, we replace (say) the Y basis with the Z basis
{|1〉|0〉, |0〉|1〉}. Measuring in this basis amounts simply
to the measurement of a time of arrival, and is thus in-
sensitive to optical errors [4]. Bits are encoded in the Z
basis, which can be used most of the times, the X basis
being used only occasionally to check coherence [5].
In a practical QKD setup, the source is an attenuated
laser: here, Alice’s source consists of a cw laser followed
α3 α2 α1
tB D
B
D
M1
D
M2
1 t− B
Alice Bob
Laser
Laser IM
Prep.
α β
bit 0
bit 1
decoy
FIG. 1: Comparison of the currently implemented BB84 pro-
tocol with phase encoding (Top) with the scheme proposed
here (Bottom). Arrows over pulses indicate coherence (phase
set to 0 in our scheme). See text for details.
by an intensity modulator (IM), which either prepares a
pulse of mean photon-number µ or blocks completely the
beam (empty or ”vacuum” pulses) [9]. The k-th logical
bit is encoded in the two-pulse sequences consisting of a
non-empty and an empty pulse:
|0k〉 =
∣∣√µ〉
2k−1
|0〉
2k , (1)
|1k〉 = |0〉2k−1
∣∣√µ〉
2k
. (2)
Note that |0k〉 and |1k〉 are not orthogonal, due to their
vacuum component; however, a time-of-arrival measure-
ment, whenever conclusive, provides the optimal unam-
biguous determination of the bit value [6]. To check co-
herence, we produce a fraction f ≪ 1 of decoy sequences∣∣√µ〉
2k−1
∣∣√µ〉
2k
; while for BB84, one should produce
the two states
∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉
2k−1
∣∣∣±
√
µ/2
〉
2k
. Now, due to
the coherence of the laser, there is a well-defined phase
between any two non-empty pulses: within each decoy
sequence, but also across the bit-separation in the case
where bit number k is 1 and bit number k+1 is 0 (a ”1-0
bit sequence”). Since we produce equally-spaced pulses,
the coherence of both decoy and 1-0 bit sequences can
be checked with a single interferometer (see Fig. 1, Bot-
tom). And there is a further benefit: coherence being
2distributed both within and across the bit separations,
Eve cannot count the number of photons in any finite
number of pulses without introducing errors [6]: in our
scheme the PNS attacks can be detected [7]. To detect
PNS attacks in BB84, one needs to complicate the pro-
tocol by the technique of decoy states, which consists in
varying µ [8].
The pulses propagate to Bob on a quantum channel
characterized by a transmission t, and are split at a
non-equilibrated beam-splitter with transmission coeffi-
cient tB <∼ 1. The pulses that are transmitted (data
line) are used to establish the raw key by measuring
the arrival times of the photons. The counting rate is
R = 1 − e−µttBη ≈ µttBη, where η is the quantum ef-
ficiency of the photon counter. The pulses that are re-
flected at Bob’s beam-splitter go to the interferometer
that is used to check quantum coherence (monitoring
line). Indeed, when both pulses j and j + 1 are non-
empty, then only detector DM1 can fire at time j + 1.
Coherence can be quantified by Alice and Bob through
the visibility of the interference
V =
p(DM1)− p(DM2)
p(DM1) + p(DM2)
(3)
where p(DMj) is the probability that detector DMj fired
at a time where only DM1 should have fired. These prob-
abilities are small, the average detection rate on the mon-
itoring line being 1
2
µ t (1− tB)η per pulse. Still, if the bit
rate is high, meaningful estimates can be done in a rea-
sonable time.
Let’s summarize the protocol:
1. Alice sends a large number of times ”bit 0” with
probability 1−f
2
, ”bit 1” with probability 1−f
2
and
the decoy sequence with probability f .
2. At the end of the exchange, Bob reveals for which
bits he obtained detections in the data line and
when detector D2M has fired.
3. Alice tells Bob which bits he has to remove from his
raw key, since they are due to detections of decoy
sequences (sifting).
4. Analyzing the detections in D2M Alice estimates
the break of coherence through the visibilities V1−0
and Vd associated respectively to 1-0 bit sequences
and to decoy sequences, and computes Eve’s infor-
mation.
5. Finally, Alice and Bob run error correction and pri-
vacy amplification and end up with a secret key.
Estimate of the secret key rate. The performance of a
QKD protocol is quantified by the achievable secret key
rate Rsk. To compute this quantity, we need to intro-
duce several parameters. The fraction of bits kept after
sifting (sifted key rate) is Rs(µ) = [R + 2pd(1 − R)] ps
with R = µttBη the counting rate due to photons defined
above, pd the probability of a dark count, and ps = 1− f
here. The amount of errors in the sifted key is called
quantum bit error rate (QBER, Q). Moreover, this key
is not secret: Eve knows a fraction IEve of it. Some clas-
sical postprocessing (error correction and privacy ampli-
fication) allows to extract a key which is errorless and
secret, while removing a fraction h(Q)+ IEve, where h is
binary entropy. Thence,
Rsk = Rs(µ)
(
1− h(Q)− IEve
)
. (4)
With this figure of merit, we can compare our scheme
to BB84 implemented using the interferometric bases X
and Y, as it is done today, with an asymmetric use of
the bases such that ps = 1 − f (BB84XY ). We require
that all the visibilities are equal: VX = VY in BB84XY ,
V1−0 = Vd in our scheme — otherwise, Alice and Bob
abort the protocol. Under this assumption, the QBER of
BB84 is Q(µ) = [R 1−V
2
+(1−R)pd]ps/Rs ≡ Qopt+Qdet;
while in our scheme Q(µ) = Qdet, independent of V .
In order to estimate IEve, we restrict the class of Eve’s
attacks [6], waiting for a full security analysis. Because
of losses and the existence of multi-photon pulses, Eve
can gain full information on a fraction of the bits without
introducing any errors. This fraction is either r = µ(1−t)
or r = µ
2t
, according to whether PNS attacks don’t or do
introduce errors [2, 6]. Then Eve performs the intercept-
resend attack on a fraction pIR of the remaining pulses.
In BB84XY , she introduces the error (1− r)pIR 14 = 1−V2
and gains the information I = (1 − r)pIR 12 = 1 − V .
On the present protocol, the IR will be performed in the
time basis, so I = (1 − r)pIR. However, since we use
only one decoy sequence, if Eve detects a photon in two
successive pulses she knows what sequence to prepare;
the introduced error is thence 1−V = Iξ with ξ = 2e−µt
1+e−µt
the probability that Eve detects something in one pulse
and nothing in the other. PluggingQ(µ) and IEve = r+I
into Eq. (4), we have Rsk as an explicit function of µ;
Alice and Bob must choose µ in order to maximize it.
The result of numerical optimization is shown in Fig. 2
[10]. As expected, the present protocol is more robust
than BB84XY against the decrease of visibility.
Proof-of-principle experiment. We show that a reason-
ably low QBER and good visibility can be obtained us-
ing standard telecom components in an implementation
with optical fibers. The experimental setup is sketched
in Fig. 3. The light of a cw laser (wavelength 1550 nm)
passes through a intensity modulator (IM), which pre-
pares the chosen pulse sequence. For simplicity, we send
always the same 8-pulse sequence as shown in the figure,
namely the string D010, where D stands for a decoy se-
quence. The frequency of 434 MHz of clock C1 defines
the time τ between two successive pulses. The frequency
of logical bits in a sequence is half of this frequency. The
clock C2 at 600 kHz generates the delay between two
successive sequences. After the modulator, the light is
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FIG. 2: Estimate of the secret key rates Eq. (4) for the present
protocol and for BB84XY with and without decoy states, as a
function of the losses on the line ℓ (t = 10−ℓ/10). Parameters:
η = 10%, pd = 10
−5, tB = 1 and f = 0.1. Visibility: V =
1 (full lines, identical for the two first protocols), V = 0.9
(dashed lines) and V = 0.8 (dotted lines; Rsk = 0 for BB84
without decoy states).
attenuated by the variable attenuator (VA) in order to
obtain µ = 0.5 for 5 dB loss in the quantum channel
[10]. The synchronization signal directly starts the time-
to-digital converter (TDC) and triggers the detectors on
Bob’s side. The detectors DB (data line) and DM (mon-
itoring line) are opened with gates of 25 ns accepting the
whole sequence, featuring quantum efficiency η = 10%
and a dark count probability pd = 2.5× 10−5 per ns. Of
course, due to the deadtime of the detectors, only one
event per sequence and detector can be detected. The
stop signal from DM arm is delayed, which allows to
record the events of both detectors by the same TDC.
The Michelson interferometer of the monitoring line has
the same path length difference τ (46 cm of optical fibre)
corresponding to the clock frequency. It is enclosed in an
insulated, temperature controlled box (IB). The phase
can be changed by changing the temperature. The inter-
ferometer (hence our entire setup) is polarization insensi-
tive due to Faraday mirrors (FM) and features a classical
fringe visibility of 99%.
The raw detection rate is of 17.0±0.1 kHz. The de-
tection rate is limited by the detectors, due to the 10
µs deadtime we have to introduce in order to limit af-
terpulses. With current detectors, the potential of an
improved setup continuously sending pulses at C1, with
optimized values for µ, f and tB could only be exploited
at long distances. Otherwise, one could use a detection
system based on up-conversion and fast thin silicon de-
tector [11].
The QBER for the pulse sequences ’10’ and ’01’ is ob-
tained by considering the time windows of 1.7 ns as in-
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup (see text for details).
dicated in Fig. 4. The value is Q = 5.2 ± 0.4%. The
contribution of detector noise and afterpulses (which are
rather high for the long gates and high repetition rates
we are using) is estimated to be 4%; we attribute the
remaining 1% to unperfect intensity modulation, mainly
due to too slow electronics and to the jitter of the detec-
tors.
The visibility of the interfering pulses on detector DM
is measured by varying the phase (i.e the temperature)
of the interferometer. The raw visibility is Vraw ≥ 92%,
if we consider 1.7 ns time windows. The net visibil-
ity, obtained deducing the dark counts and afterpulses
is V ≈ 98%. We attribute the slight reduction of the vis-
ibility to a non perfect overlap of the interfering pulses
due to timing jitter and fluctuations in the intensity mod-
ulation. However, this reduced visibility has no signifi-
cant consequence on the secret key rate (Fig. 2). This
tolerance in visibility simplifies the adjustment of the in-
terferometers. With our basic thermal stabilization the
interferometer needed to be readjusted only about every
30 minutes. Indeed, for our path length difference, a tem-
perature stability of 0.01 K guarantees V >∼ 80%. Note,
the higher C1, the easier becomes the stabilization of the
interferometer.
Conclusion. We have introduced a new scheme for
QKD and presented first experimental results. The
scheme features several advantages: The data line is very
simple, with low losses at Bob’s side and small optical
QBER. The scheme is tolerant against reduced interfer-
ence visibility and is robust against PNS attacks (thus
allowing the mean photon number to be large, typically
µ ≈ 0.5). Finally, it is polarization insensitive. The ex-
istence of such a scheme shows that the main limiting
parameter for practical quantum cryptography are the
imperfections of the detectors.
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FIG. 4: Detection as a function of the difference of time be-
tween start and detection. Logical values and pulse values are
depicted in more of the measurement. The difference of am-
plitude of the different peaks is due to variation in efficiency
in the detection gate.
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